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UPDATES FROM INTERNATIONAL AND  
INTERNATIONALIZED CRIMINAL COURTS & TRIBUNALS
international Criminal tribunal 
For the Former yugoslavia
karadZic on trial
The trial of Radovan Karadzic, accused 
of masterminding the most violent epi-
sode in Europe since the Holocaust, began 
on October 26, 2009 at the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugosla-
via (ICTY). Karadzic was the President 
of Republika Srpska and Commander of 
the Bosnian Serb Army during the 1992 
to 1995 war in the Balkans, which caused 
nearly one hundred thousand deaths and 
forced approximately 2.2 million people 
to flee their homes. Karadzic’s indict-
ment lists eleven counts of genocide, 
war crimes, and crimes against human-
ity. These charges stem from the role he 
played, along with Ratko Mladic, in lead-
ing the July 1995 attacks at Srebrenica, 
in which approximately 8,000 Bosnian 
Muslim men and boys were slaughtered in 
a UN “Safe Area.” Karadzic and Mladic 
are also accused of taking UN personnel 
hostage and laying siege to Sarajevo for 
43 months, killing thousands of innocent 
civilians.
Karadzic’s eccentricities have had a 
significant effect on his trial. Karadzic was 
originally indicted by the ICTY in July 
1995, but did not first appear before the 
court until July 31, 2008, following his cap-
ture in Serbia. He had been in hiding since 
1996, most recently living in Belgrade 
and, with his background as a psychiatrist, 
working as an alternative healer. Initially, 
he refused to recognize the authority of the 
ICTY, forcing the court to enter a plea on 
his behalf in August 2008. He originally 
insisted on representing himself, but has 
also asked the ICTY to provide paid legal 
assistance. In addition, he maintains a large 
staff of volunteer lawyers, researchers, for-
mer politicians, and professors.
Karadzic refused to attend the first three 
days of his trial, claiming he needed more 
time to prepare and review approximately 
1.2 million pages of documents for his 
defense. The ICTY judges warned him 
repeatedly of the consequences should he 
continue the boycott, and Karadzic attended 
a procedural hearing on November 3, 2009. 
Days later, Judge O-Gon Kwan instructed 
the ICTY Registrar to assign counsel to 
the accused, noting that should Karadzic 
continue his boycott, the appointed counsel 
would argue on his behalf. The Judge par-
tially granted Karadzic’s requested delay, 
allowing a continuance until March 2010. 
So far, it appears that Karadzic is basing 
much of his defense on his claim that 
U.S. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, chief 
negotiator of the Dayton Accords, agreed 
to grant him immunity from prosecution in 
exchange for his resignation as the Presi-
dent of Republika Srpska in 1996.
Generally, commentators view Judge 
Kwan’s decision favorably as the ICTY’s 
credibility suffered during the rambling 
defense of Slobodan Milosevic, who also 
represented himself. Karadzic’s behavior 
inspires a legitimate fear of similar reper-
cussions. Judge Kwan’s decision is an 
attempt to balance the interests of effi-
ciency with the accused’s right to self-
representation. Its success will depend on 
how Karadzic proceeds during the trial.
international Criminal tribunal 
For rWanda
niZeyimana BrougHt into ictr 
custody
On October 5, 2009, Ugandan authori-
ties arrested Idelphonse Nizeyimana, one 
of the suspects wanted for leading and 
perpetrating the Rwandan genocide in 
1994. Authorities arrested Nizeyimana and 
handed him over to be tried by the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR). The tracking team for the ICTR 
collaborated with Ugandan police to cap-
ture Nizeyimana, who was detained on his 
way to Kenya from the Democratic Repub-
lic of Congo (DRC).
Nizeyimana is the second individual 
to be arrested from a list of thirteen fugi-
tives in less than two months. He was also 
tagged by the ICTR in 2000 as one of eight 
key suspects in the genocide. Nizeyimana’s 
initial appearance before the ICTR took 
place on October 14, 2009 before Judge 
Khalida R. Khan, where he pleaded not 
guilty.
Nizeyimana served as the deputy intel-
ligence chief and captain of the Ecole des 
Sous Officiers (ESO), and is suspected 
of being a key organizer in orchestrating 
the genocide, estimated to have killed 
between half a million and a million Tutsis 
and moderate Hutus. He is also suspected 
of murdering Queen Rosalie Gicanda, a 
respected and symbolic figure for Tutsis 
in Rwanda.
The ICTR has charged Nizeyimana with 
five counts of genocide and crimes against 
humanity. He is alleged to have formed 
secret units of soldiers to murder prominent 
Tutsis, set up roadblocks to detain and kill 
Tutsi civilians, given direct orders to mas-
sacre civilians, provided material support 
such as grenades, transported members of 
the Interahamwe (extremist Hutu militia) 
to Muslim quarters to carry out attacks, 
assisted in organizing the massacre at the 
Butare University in 1994, and participated 
in preparing lists that identified people, 
mostly Tutsi intellectuals and Tutsis in 
positions of authority, to be “eliminated.” 
Nizeyimana had been evading arrest by 
traveling under false papers. Until recently, 
he is believed to have been hiding in the 
jungles of eastern DRC, where he belonged 
to the Hutu rebel group, Democratic Forces 
for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). This 
rebel group continues to commit atrocities 
against civilians in the DRC. The DRC has 
been criticized for failing to cooperate with 
the ICTR in capturing wanted suspects; but 
the arrest of Nizeyimana comes right after 
an agreement was reached with the DRC 
to aid in identifying other fugitives that are 
suspected of hiding with the FDLR.
The ICTR would be unable to continue 
its operations without third party coop-
eration, like that of Uganda. The ICTR’s 
ability to persuade other states to assist it 
is one of the reasons that an international-
ized court is better equipped than national 
courts to try perpetrators of the genocide. 
Article 28 of UN Security Council Resolu-
tion 955 mandates state cooperation with 
the ICTR in the “investigation and pros-
ecution of those accused and indicted by 
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the Tribunal.” Cooperation from states like 
Uganda, the DRC, and Rwanda in evidence 
gathering and coordinated investigations 
is essential for the successful operation of 
the ICTR.
The ProsecuTor v. rukundo, case no. 
ictr-2001-70-t
On February 27, 2009, Trial Cham-
ber II of the ICTR issued a judgment in 
the case against Emmanuel Rukundo. The 
accused, who served as an ordained priest 
during the 1994 genocide, was accused 
of crimes based on his role in abducting, 
killing, and sexually assaulting Tutsis at 
locations under the administration of the 
Kabgayi Diocese in Gitarama prefecture 
during April and May 1994. Rukundo was 
convicted of genocide based on acts of kill-
ing and causing serious bodily and mental 
harm that were carried out with the intent 
to destroy, in whole or in part, the Tutsi eth-
nic group. He was also convicted of mur-
der and extermination as crimes against 
humanity. The Trial Chamber sentenced 
Rukundo to twenty-five years in prison.
Rukundo’s conviction for genocide was 
based, in part, on the killing of a Tutsi 
woman named Madame Rudahunga and 
for causing serious bodily harm to two of 
Rudahunga’s children and two other Tutsi 
civilians. The victims had taken refuge at 
St. Joseph’s College in Kabgayi, the prem-
ises of which Rukundo searched together 
with armed Rwandan soldiers looking for 
those with links to the Inkotanyi (Tutsi 
rebel army). Evidence indicated that the 
soldiers abducted Madame Rudahunga and 
drove to her house, with Rukundo follow-
ing in another vehicle, where they shot her 
to death. The perpetrators, including Ruku-
ndo, returned immediately to St. Joseph’s 
and abducted the four other victims who 
were taken away, brutally beaten, and left 
for dead. Rukundo was later heard brag-
ging about the killing of Rudahunga.
While the evidence did not establish 
that Rukundo himself shot or beat any 
of the victims, the Chamber cited the 
Seromba Appeals Chamber holding that 
the commission of a crime is not limited 
to “direct and physical perpetration.” The 
Chamber also recalled that in Gacumbitsi, 
the accused was held to have commit-
ted genocide when he separated Tutsis 
from Hutus prior to the killing of the 
Tutsis who had been separated. In that 
case, the Appeals Chamber held that the 
accused’s actions were “as much an inte-
gral part of the genocide as were the 
killings which [they] enabled.” The Trial 
Chamber reached a similar conclusion for 
Rukundo’s acts, noting that Rukundo had 
participated from the outset and through 
the completion of the crimes, and empha-
sizing that Rukundo took ownership of 
the crimes by boasting later about the 
killing. The Chamber went on to conclude 
that Rukundo had acted with the requisite 
genocidal intent, noting in particular that 
Rukundo had referred to the Rudahunga 
family as inyenzi (derogatory term for Tut-
sis, literally “cockroaches”).
The Chamber also determined that 
the killing of Madame Rudahunga sup-
ported the charge of murder as a crime 
against humanity, given the context of 
widespread and systematic attacks against 
Tutsi civilians at the time of the murder, 
Rukundo’s knowledge of these conditions, 
and the relationship between the mur-
der and the systematic attacks. Citing the 
Appeals Chamber in Musema, the Cham-
ber observed that cumulative convictions 
for genocide and crimes against humanity 
based on the same acts are permitted since 
each crime has distinct elements.
The Chamber further supported Ruku-
ndo’s conviction for genocide based on a 
series of mass killings at St. Leon Major 
Seminary. Evidence was adduced that on at 
least four occasions in April and May 1994, 
Rukundo visited St. Leon Minor Seminary 
accompanied by soldiers and Interaha-
mwe, identified Tutsis from a list, and then 
departed from the Seminary. Shortly after 
Rukundo’s departure, those identified refu-
gees were abducted by soldiers and never 
seen again. Citing the Appeals Chamber in 
the Kayishema and Ruzindana cases, the 
Trial Chamber determined that the only 
reasonable inference to be drawn, given 
the pervasive violence against Tutsis in 
1994, was that the Tutsis abducted from the 
Seminary were murdered. The Chamber 
went on to reason, as it had with respect to 
the finding of genocide committed at St. 
Joseph’s College, that Rukundo’s conduct 
at the Seminary amounted to “commis-
sion” of genocide, since his acts were 
as much a part of the crimes as were the 
abductions and killings they enabled. The 
Chamber further determined that Rukundo 
acted with intent to destroy ethnic Tutsis, 
in whole or in part, given the context of 
anti-Tutsi violence, and Rukundo’s state-
ments that “something had to be done” 
about those who were sympathizing with 
the Rwandan Patriotic Force.
The Chamber also reviewed allegations 
of extermination as a crime against human-
ity based on the same evidence as that 
presented for the crime of genocide. It 
found there was no evidence that the Ruda-
hunga murder, and the serious harm to her 
children and the two other Tutsis, were 
committed as part of killings on a mass 
scale. The killings at St. Leon Seminary, 
however, met the requirements for exter-
mination, given the numerous occurrences 
of abduction and the number of refu-
gees removed (at least one busload), even 
though there was no evidence adduced 
of a specific number of resulting deaths. 
Because the acts of extermination were 
conducted as part of a systematic attack 
on civilians, the Chamber was satisfied 
of Rukundo’s responsibility for the crime 
against humanity of extermination.
Finally, the majority of the Trial Cham-
ber found that Rukundo’s genocide charge 
was supported by evidence that he caused 
serious mental harm to a Tutsi woman 
through sexual assault. The relevant facts 
involved a twenty-one-year-old Tutsi 
woman, known as Witness CCH, who 
took refuge at St. Leon Minor Seminary 
around mid-May 1994. She knew Rukundo 
previously and had attended his ordina-
tion. When CCH first saw Rukundo at the 
seminary, she was encouraged and asked 
if he could help hide her. Rukundo not 
only refused, but also said that she and her 
whole family had to be killed. Attempting 
to ingratiate herself, CCH helped Ruku-
ndo, who was armed, carry some belong-
ings into a small room, where she chatted 
and sipped beer with him. Rukundo then 
locked the door and sexually assaulted her. 
The only relevant testimony on this inci-
dent came from the victim and Rukundo, 
but the full Chamber determined that CCH 
was credible. Moreover, the full Chamber 
agreed that there was no question but 
that Rukundo’s act was of a sexual nature 
and that the conduct was inherently coer-
cive, given both the general atmosphere of 
Tutsi annihilation and the victim’s specific 
situation of duress and intimidation. The 
Chamber then went on to determine that 
the victim had suffered mental harm as 
a result of the assault. On this issue, the 
majority of the Chamber recalled that the 
relevant harm must be more than minor 
but need not be permanent, that the Tri-
bunal has previously found serious mental 
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harm to be present where there is sexual 
assault combined with the threat of death, 
and that sexual assault has been identified 
as one of the worst forms of serious harm 
since it combines both bodily and mental 
harm. The majority thus decided that the 
only reasonable conclusion was that the 
victim suffered serious mental harm, as 
she was a young Tutsi woman fearing for 
her life, seeking protection from a known 
and trusted clergy member in a posi-
tion of authority, who abused his position 
and sexually assaulted her under coercive 
circumstances.
Judge Seon Ki Park dissented from the 
majority’s finding that Witness CCH suf-
fered serious mental harm as a result of the 
sexual assault carried out by Rukundo. In 
his opinion, Judge Park stressed that Wit-
ness CCH “did not provide direct evidence 
about her mental state apart from the fact 
that she could not tell anyone about the 
incident” and that the Prosecution “did not 
even ask her how the incident has affected 
her life, her mental well-being, her sub-
sequent sexual relationships, or put any 
other question to the witness which could 
assist the Chamber in making this find-
ing.” While Judge Park agreed with the 
majority’s factual findings regarding the 
surrounding circumstances of the assault, 
he expressed “doubts that these facts rise 
to the level of serious mental harm required 
for a conviction of genocide,” noting that 
“genocide is a crime of the most serious 
gravity which affects the very foundations 
of society and shocks the conscience of 
humanity.”
In sentencing the accused to a prison 
term of 25 years, the Chamber found Ruku-
ndo’s stature in Rwandan society to be an 
aggravating factor. The Chamber found 
both Rukundo’s education and his abuse of 
his moral authority over trusting members 
of his community, which enabled him to 
further the abduction, sexual assault, and 
murder of Tutsis, to be highly aggravating.
The ProsecuTor v. callixTe kalimanzira, 
case no. ictr-05-88-t
On June 22, 2009, Trial Chamber III of 
the ICTR issued its judgment in the case 
against Callixte Kalimanzira, the interim 
director of the Ministry of the Interior of 
Rwanda. Kalimanzira was found guilty of 
aiding and abetting genocide and of insti-
gating genocide under Article 2(3)(a) of 
the ICTR Statute, and of committing direct 
and public incitement to commit genocide 
under Article 2(3)(c). The Chamber held it 
was required to dismiss the count of com-
plicity in genocide under Article 2(3)(e) of 
the Statute also included in the indictment, 
as it was expressly pleaded in alternative 
to the count of genocide. After judgment, 
Kalimanzira was sentenced to thirty years 
in prison.
The Chamber first considered the geno-
cide charge. While it dismissed several of 
the allegations made by the Prosecution 
because of a lack of reliable evidence, the 
Chamber was convinced that Kalimanzira 
had instigated and aided and abetted geno-
cide on multiple occasions. For instance, 
the Chamber found that Kalimanzira’s fail-
ure to object to inflammatory remarks that 
were made in his presence led to the killing 
of Tutsi women, elders, and children. Spe-
cifically, Kalimanzira was present at the 
inauguration of the new bourgmestre of the 
Muganza commune in June 1994, when the 
individual being inaugurated admonished 
those in attendance for continuing to hide 
Tutsis. Based on this evidence, the Cham-
ber concluded that Kalimanzira knew that 
the speech would instigate persons present 
at the inauguration to kill Tutsis and that 
this instigation was tantamount to an offi-
cial sanction of such actions. The Chamber 
further concluded that Kalimanzira’s pres-
ence during the speech “lent moral support 
to Ndayambaje’s instigation of genocide” 
and that, due to his position as a well-
respected authority figure and a native of 
Muganza commune, Kalimanzira’s moral 
support itself substantially contributed to 
the commission of this crime. Finally, 
the Chamber found that Kaliminzira had 
exhibited, in the context of the inaugural 
speech and elsewhere, the intent to destroy 
the Tutsi group, and thus was responsible 
instigating genocide.
Notably, the defense had argued that 
the Chamber could not consider Kaliman-
zira’s “hierarchical power” in relation to 
any of the allegations against him because 
the Prosecutor had accused Kalimanzira 
only of direct criminal responsibility under 
Article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute and not of 
superior responsibility under Article 6(3). 
Article 6(3) holds superiors responsible 
for acts perpetrated by subordinates where 
the superior knew or had reason to know 
the subordinate would commit the act and 
took no reasonable measures to prevent it 
or to punish the subordinate. The Chamber 
rejected this argument, stating that crimes 
committed using a person’s authority were 
not limited to liability under Article 6(3), 
and that the use of authority could be con-
sidered when deciding an accused’s direct 
responsibility under Article 6(1). Indeed, 
the Chamber noted that the Appeals Cham-
ber has held that the Trial Chamber should, 
where liability is found under both direct 
and superior responsibility, convict under 
direct responsibility and consider the supe-
rior position as an aggravating circum-
stance. Moreover, the Chamber explained 
that Article 6(1) includes criminal respon-
sibility for ordering others to commit crim-
inal acts. Therefore, Kalimanzira’s alleged 
authority could be used as evidence that he 
had the power to order others to commit 
such acts. Similarly, the Chamber stated 
that omissions by a person of authority 
could be covered under Article 6(1). For 
instance, if a person has a duty act to pre-
vent a crime and he or she did not act to 
prevent it, this could be prosecutable under 
Article 6(1). Therefore, the Chamber con-
sidered Kalimanzira’s position of author-
ity and standing in the community when 
analyzing the allegation that he aided and 
abetted genocide through his actions at the 
Muganza inauguration speech.
The Chamber further supported its hold-
ing that the accused was guilty of genocide 
based on the finding that he instigated and 
aided and abetted genocide at a roadblock 
by (i) asking the men manning the road-
block why they had no weapons; (ii) asking 
the men why they had permitted passing 
Tutsis to sit nearby rather than killing 
them; and (iii) providing one of the men 
with a firearm, which was subsequently 
used to kill nearby Tutsis. The genocide 
charge was also supported by a finding that 
Kalimanzira aided and abetted genocide 
when in April 1994 he lured Tutsis to shel-
ter at Kabuye Hill by promising protection 
from the violence and then brought armed 
men to attack them.
Turning to the charge of direct and pub-
lic incitement of genocide, the Chamber 
began by reviewing the relevant law, noting 
the charged crime is an inchoate crime, and 
therefore it is not necessary to prove that 
the incitement achieved a genocidal result. 
Rather, it is sufficient to establish that 
an accused directly and publicly incited 
the commission of genocide (actus reus), 
and that he had the intent to directly and 
publicly incite others to commit genocide 
(mens rea). By contrast, the Chamber 
noted, an accused will be guilty of com-
mitting genocide by means of instigation 
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only if the instigation in fact substantially 
contributed to the commission of genocide. 
Another distinction between direct and 
public incitement to commit genocide and 
commission by instigation is that the for-
mer requires the incitement to be “public” 
and “direct.” Under the jurisprudence of 
the ICTR, “public” incitement means that 
the statements must have been available to 
the public at large. The meaning of “direct” 
incitement is dependent on whether the 
intended audience understood, at the time 
of the act of incitement, that it was a call to 
commit genocide.
Based on this law, the Chamber refused 
to find Kalimanzira guilty of direct and 
public incitement of genocide for alleged 
statements made at a meeting of a “crisis 
committee.” The meeting was not open 
to the general public and did not meet the 
requirement that the incitement be “pub-
lic.” The Chamber also declined to make a 
finding of direct and public incitement of 
genocide based on allegations relating to 
statements made by Kalimanzira at a foot-
ball field, since the men he spoke to could 
not say for certain whether he was telling 
them to kill Tutsis or simply to be more 
vigilant in their own defense. However, the 
Chamber did find Kalimanzira guilty of 
direct and public incitement of genocide 
for a speech he made at a primary school 
during which he thanked those in atten-
dance for doing all they could to get rid of 
“the enemy” and instructed them to con-
tinue to search for “enemies” hidden in the 
bush or in people’s homes. The Chamber 
noted that witnesses present at the speech 
understood that “enemy” meant any Tutsi, 
and that therefore the speech amounted to 
a direct call to genocidal action.
extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts oF Cambodia
international co-investigating Judge 
of tHe eccc accused of Bias
Allegations of corruption and bias are 
not new to the Extraordinary Chambers 
in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), the 
hybrid international criminal court estab-
lished to try former members of the Khmer 
Rouge. However, such allegations have 
traditionally involved Cambodian mem-
bers of the Court. This trend changed in 
mid-October 2009, when defense lawyers 
for one of the four defendants currently 
before the ECCC filed motions to have 
the international Co-Investigating Judge, 
Marcel Lemonde, removed from the case 
on accusations of bias.
Lemonde is one of two judges who have 
an obligation to investigate the charges 
that the prosecutors bring to the ECCC 
and then decide if there is enough evi-
dence to go forward with the case. The 
Co-Investigating Judges are required to 
remain impartial during the investigation 
process. This neutrality is crucial, as the 
defense is not permitted to conduct its own 
investigations, and the prosecution cannot 
investigate after its initial submissions.
The current accusations of bias have 
arisen in Case 002, the second case to 
come before the ECCC. Recently, Judge 
Lemonde has summoned six high-ranking 
members of the current Cambodian gov-
ernment, including the presidents of the 
Senate and National Assembly, to testify 
as witnesses in Case 002, a move which 
has incited criticism from Prime Minister 
Hun Sen.
These allegations arose from a sworn 
statement by Wayne Bastin, a former chief 
of the Intelligence and Analysis Unit of 
the Office of the Co-Investigating Judges, 
that during a meeting at Lemonde’s home, 
Lemonde stated his preference that inves-
tigators “find more inculpatory evidence 
than exculpatory evidence” in the pend-
ing case against the former Khmer Rouge 
leaders.
Lawyers for the defendant Ieng Sary 
have filed a motion for Lemonde to be 
removed from the case, and lawyers for 
defendant Khieu Samphan said they would 
file a similar motion. These motions will 
then go to the Pre-Trial Chamber for con-
sideration. ECCC spokesman Lars Olsen 
said that Lemonde “does not wish to 
comment on the allegations,” but would 
“provide the Pre-Trial Chamber with all 
necessary information.” In order to remove 
the judge, the defense would have to prove 
there is a “systemic bias” in favor of the 
prosecution; one possibly biased comment 
alone would not suffice.
If Lemonde is removed, his previous 
investigative work would still remain valid 
under the Court’s internal rules. The reserve 
international Co-Investigating Judge, Sieg-
fried Blunk, would take this case if Lem-
onde were to be removed. If the allegations 
are proven true and the Pre-Trial Chamber 
decides that Lemonde should be removed 
from the case, the legitimacy of the ECCC 
will be damaged at a time when it is 
already struggling with funding, concerns 
about victim participation, and corruption 
allegations.
international Criminal Court
icc grants interim release to 
BemBa
On August 14, 2009, Pre-Trial Cham-
ber II of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) granted Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo 
(Bemba) interim release pending his trial 
in 2010. A first for the ICC, Bemba’s 
release reveals the difficulties for the ICC 
when it relies on States Parties to imple-
ment its decisions.
Bemba is the first detainee to be 
charged for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity committed in the Central African 
Republic. Bemba was the alleged president 
and commander of the Mouvement de 
Liberation du Congo as well as the former 
vice president of the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC) and a senator in its Parlia-
ment. In June 2009, five of the eight counts 
brought against Bemba were confirmed 
and the ICC determined the case could 
proceed to trial. Pursuant to the Statute for 
the ICC (Rome Statute), Judge Ekaterina 
Trendafilova ruled on Bemba’s release 
in August determining that he no longer 
fulfilled continued detention requirements 
under Article 58(1) of the Rome Statute. 
Article 58(1) requires that a defendant 
remain in custody:
(i) to ensure his or her appearance 
at trial; 
(ii) to ensure he or she does not 
obstruct or endanger the investiga-
tion or court proceedings; and 
(iii) to prevent him or her from con-
tinuing with the commission of the 
same or related crimes which arise 
out of the same circumstances in the 
present case.
While Bemba has powerful connections 
in both the DRC and Europe, his contin-
ued political aspirations and his complete 
cooperation with the restrictions placed 
on him while attending his father’s funeral 
persuaded Judge Trendafilova that he was 
no longer a flight risk and could be allowed 
conditional release. The Chamber’s ruling 
cannot be implemented, however, unless 
a state consents to accept Bemba. The 
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ICC has requested that Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, Portugal, or South Africa 
accept Bemba while he awaits trial. The 
state that receives him will then have 
the responsibility of supervising him and 
ensuring he returns for his trial. Despite 
the ICC’s requests, each of the six States 
Parties have raised objections to accepting 
him, and without a host country, the ICC 
cannot release Bemba.
Without cooperation from States Par-
ties, the ICC’s authority is undermined. 
Under Article 86 of the Rome Statute, 
States Parties have an obligation to cooper-
ate with the conditional release of defen-
dants; however, according to the Coalition 
for the International Criminal Court, “the 
Assembly of States Parties, which is the 
main oversight body of the ICC, has fallen 
well short of ensuring that states parties 
are ready and willing to cooperate with all 
requests for cooperation.” Interim release 
for defendants awaiting trial is vital to 
ensuring a fair trial and protecting the 
ICC’s image as an unbiased venue. With-
out the full and immediate cooperation of 
States Parties, the ICC will be unable to 
provide fair, impartial justice for defen-
dants or victims. Bemba’s release has been 
suspended on appeal, but if the ruling is 
affirmed, its execution will depend on 
the ICC’s ability to persuade or command 
cooperation from States Parties.
impact of regulation 55 on icc 
proceedings
On January 26, 2008, Thomas Lubanga 
became the first defendant tried at the ICC. 
Lubanga was allegedly the president of the 
Union of Congolese Patriots and the com-
mander of its military. He has been charged 
with two counts of war crimes for con-
scripting child soldiers to further the war in 
the DRC. The ICC is now considering the 
participating victims’ application to add 
charges of inhumane treatment and sexual 
slavery against Lubanga under ICC Regu-
lation 55. The treatment of the victims’ 
application highlights several challenges 
faced by the new court.
Trial Chamber I responded to the vic-
tims’ application on July 14, 2009, stating 
that the Court could include additional 
charges against Lubanga. The Chamber 
held that Regulation 55(2) allows it to add 
charges based on new evidence at any time 
during the trial. The Chamber also ruled 
that it can suspend the hearing to give 
parties time to prepare for trial on the addi-
tional charges, and that parties will have 
a right to re-examine previous witnesses, 
call new witnesses, and present new evi-
dence in light of the new charges. Both 
the Defense and the Prosecutor appealed 
the Chamber’s ruling, arguing that adding 
new charges would be unfair to the accused 
and could extend the trial for several more 
months, delaying future trials at the ICC. 
The trial has been suspended until the 
Appeals Chamber resolves this issue.
The Regulation 55(2) appeal highlights 
several issues facing the ICC. One chal-
lenge is determining the victims’ role, 
compared to that of the prosecution and 
defense. The ICC is the first international 
court to statutorily permit victims to par-
ticipate independently from the prosecu-
tion and defense. The Rome Statute grants 
the Court discretion to allow victims to 
present their concerns “in a manner which 
is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with 
the rights of the accused and a fair and 
impartial trial.” However, as the Lubanga 
application itself points out, Regulation 55 
fails to indicate which parties may request 
that the Court exercise this discretion.
Another challenge is the Chamber’s 
extension of the jura novit curia principle, 
under which a judge is allowed to indepen-
dently re-characterize the charges based on 
existing facts. Through its interpretation 
of Regulation 55(2), the Chamber widely 
departs from this principle, allowing new 
facts and evidence to be introduced to 
support new charges at any time during 
the trial.
Finally, the present appeal slows the 
Lubanga trial, which has already been 
plagued by extensive delays. After delay-
ing the trial for a year after the initial filing 
of charges, the Court has again delayed 
the trial pending the Regulation 55(2) 
appeal. If the Appeals Chamber affirms 
Trial Chamber I’s decision, the trial will 
be delayed once more to give the parties 
sufficient time to prepare for new charges. 
These delays as well as the Chamber’s 
procedural decisions have brought new 
attention to the inner workings of the new 
Court, specifically the ability of victims 
and judges to shape the proceedings. HRB
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